A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an algorithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify natural distributed algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium. This paper established new convergence results for two generalizations of proportional response in Fisher markets with buyers having CES utility functions. The starting points are respectively a new convex and a new convex-concave formulation of such markets. The two generalizations correspond to suitable mirror descent algorithms applied to these formulations. Several of our new results are a consequence of new notions of strong Bregman convexity and of strong Bregman convex-concave functions, and associated linear rates of convergence, which may be of independent interest.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important results in Algorithmic Game Theory is the PPAD-hardness of finding a Nash Equilibrium in finite games [8, 17] , which serves as a strong evidence that there is no efficient algorithm to compute Nash Equilibria. Similar hardness results have been established for markets [7, 9, 10, 14, 47] . By viewing the players and the environment collectively as implicitly performing a computation, these hardness results indicate that, in general, a market cannot reach an equilibrium quickly. In Kamal Jain's words: "If your laptop cannot find it, neither can the market" [40, Chapter 2.1].
As a result, a lot of attention has been given to the design of polynomial-time algorithms to find equilibria, either exactly or approximately, for specific families of games and markets. Most of these algorithms can be categorized as either simplex-like (e.g., Lemke-Howson), numerical methods (e.g., the interior-point method or the ellipsoid method), or some carefully-crafted combinatorial algorithm (e.g., flow-based algorithms for computing a market equilibrium for linear utility functions).
However, it seems implausible that these algorithms describe the implicit computations in games or markets. For many markets would appear to have a highly distributed environment, or need to make rapid decisions on an ongoing basis. These features would appear to preclude computations which require centralized coordination, which is essential for the three categories of algorithms above. Consequently, in order to justify equilibrium concepts, we want natural algorithms which could plausibly be running (in an implicit form) in the associated distributed environments. This paper will focus on Fisher markets (or economies 1 ). In a Fisher market there are buyers who start with money which they have no desire to keep, and sellers who have goods to sell, which they wish to sell in their entirety for money. This is a modest generalization of the notion of Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) [27, 46] . In prior work on computing equilibria for these markets, there has been a particular focus on Eisenberg-Gale markets, a term coined by Jain and Vazirani, and their generalizations [28] ; Eisenberg-Gale markets are Fisher markets in which demands are determined by homothetic utility functions. The latter markets have been seen to capture the notion of proportional fairness, as defined in the networking community [30] , which is also equivalent to the optimum Nash Social Welfare [29, 35] .
Two natural dynamics have been studied in the context of Fisher markets. The first, which is perhaps the most intuitive candidate for a natural algorithm, is tatonnement, in which the price of a good is raised if the demand exceeds the supply of the good, and decreased if the demand is too small. Implicitly, buyers' demands are assumed to be a best-response to the current prices. This highly intuitive algorithm was proposed by Walras well over a century ago [48] .
Proportional Response, in contrast, is a buyer-oriented update, originally analyzed in an effort to explain the behavior of peer-to-peer networks [31, 49] . Here, buyers update their spending in proportion to the contribution each good makes to its current utility. While its meaning is clear for linear and other separable utilities, for other classes of utilities this needs more interpretation, which we provide in Section 2. Here prices are assumed to equal the current spending. An O (1/T ) rate of convergence was shown in [2] for Fisher markets with buyers having linear utilities, and for the substitutes domain excluding linear utilities, a faster linear rate (i.e., exp(−Ω(T )) rate) of convergence was shown in [50] . This paper continues the exploration of the connection between distributed dynamic processes and convex optimization, and more specifically the relation of proportional response to mirror descent.
Our first set of results starts by rederiving Zhang's bounds for CES substitutes utilities, by showing that for this setting proportional response amounts to mirror descent on a suitable convex function. To achieve the linear rate of convergence he obtained, we need to go beyond the standard O (1/T ) rate of convergence for mirror descent with a Bregman divergence. We proceed by analogy with gradient descent. Gradient descent with a Lipschitz constraint on the gradients guarantees only an O (1/T ) rate of convergence, but a faster linear rate of convergence is obtained when the objective function f is strongly convex. For mirror descent with Bregman Divergences we introduce the notion of strong Bregman convexity and show that it also leads to a linear convergence rate. It turns out that the convex function associated with the CES substitutes utilities satisfies strong Bregman convexity, thereby obtaining Zhang's bound anew. In addition, for complementary CES utilities, the same now concave function satisfies an analogous strong Bregman concavity property, which also yields a linear rate of convergence for these utilities. In addition, if we include linear utilities in the substitutes utilities, we obtain an O (1/T ) rate of convergence; likewise, including Leontief utilities in the complementary utilities also yields an O (1/T ) rate.
Next, we seek to handle substitute and complementary CES utilities simultaneously. The challenge we face is that the objective function used for the first set of results becomes a mixed concave-convex function in this setting, and the equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of this function. We introduce the further notion of strongly-Bregman convex-concave functions, and for these functions we obtain a linear rate of convergence to the saddle point. Again, our objective function of the mixed CES utilities satisfies this property, thereby yielding linear convergence, albeit now for a damped proportional response, rather than the undamped proportional response analyzed in the first set of results. Here, including linear utilities and Leontief utilities yields an empirical O (1/T ) rate of convergence.
We note that our results are not a straightforward application of the existing mirror descent toolbox. The Bregman notions and the related convergence results in this paper are new. While the results for strong Bregman convex (resp. concave) functions are natural generalizations of gradient descent (resp. ascent) on standard strong convex (resp. concave) functions, the technique for demonstrating convergence for strong Bregman convex-concave functions appears to be new. It is not evident that suitable damping (i.e., reducing the step-size) permits a clean convergence analysis. Indeed, results showing linear point-wise convergence on convex-concave functions are rare ; in fact, the only such work we are aware of is [26] . We believe the new notions and convergence results for optimization problems may be of wider interest.
Roadmap. In Section 2 we give necessary definitions and notation, and in Section 3 we state our results precisely. Then, in Section 4, we describe related work. In Section 5 we carry out the analysis of mirror descent when Strong Bregman convexity holds, and then derive the convergence behavior of Proportional Response in each of the substitutes and complements domains. In Section 7, we perform an analogous analysis for strong Bregman convex-concave functions, and deduce the convergence behavior of a damped Proportional Response in combined substitutes and complements domains. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss the rates of convergence under some alternate measures.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We use bold symbols, e.g., p, x, e, to denote vectors.
Fisher Market. In a Fisher market, there are n perfectly divisible goods and m buyers. Without loss of generality, the supply of each good j is normalized to be one unit. Each buyer i has a utility function u i : R n + → R, and a budget of size e i . At any given price vector p ∈ R n + , each buyer purchases a maximum utility affordable collection of goods. More precisely,
A price vector p * ∈ R n + is called a market equilibrium if at p * , there exists a demand x i of each buyer i such that
The collection of x i is said to be an equilibrium allocation to the buyers. CES utilities. In this paper, each buyer i's utility function is of the form
is called a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function.
They are a class of utility functions often used in economic analysis. The limit as ρ i → −∞ is called a Leontief utility, usually written as u i (x i ) = min j x i j c i j 2 ; and the limit as ρ i → 0 is called a Cobb-Douglas utility, usually written as j x i j a i j , with j a i j = 1. The utilities with ρ i ≥ 0 capture goods that are substitutes, and those with ρ i ≤ 0 goods that are complements.
Notation. Buyer i's spending on good j, denoted by b i j , is given by b i j = x i j · p j . Also, z j = i x i j − 1 denotes the excess demand for good j. We sometimes index prices, spending, and demands by t to indicate the relevant value at time t. Finally, we use a superscript of * to indicate an equilibrium value.
Bregman Divergence and Mirror Descent. Let C be a compact and convex set. Given a differentiable convex function h(x) with domain C, the Bregman divergence generated by kernel h is denoted by d h , and is defined as:
where rint(C) is the relative interior of C. We note that, in general, d h is asymmetric, i.e., d h (x, y) d h (y, x). In this paper, we use the Kullback-Leibler or KL divergence extensively; it is the Bregman divergence generated by h(x) = j (x j · ln x j − x j ). When j x j = j y j , the explicit formula is:
For the problem of minimizing a convex function f (x) subject to x ∈ C, the mirror descent method w.r.t. Bregman divergence d h is given by the following update rule:
where Γ t > 0, and may be dependent on t.
Proportional Response. For linear utility functions, Proportional Response is the dynamic given by the spending update rule:
For substitutes CES utilities, [50] generalized this rule to: obtaining a linear convergence rate for the resulting dynamic, assuming 0 < ρ i < 1. The above rule has a natural distributed interpretation in the Fisher market setting: in each round, each buyer splits her spending on different goods in proportion to the values of a ik (x t ik ) ρ i . The seller of good j then allocates the good to buyers in proportion to the spending received from each buyer.
RESULTS

Proportional Response
It is natural to seek to extend the Proportional Response rule (2) to the complementary domain, but this rule does not lead to convergent behavior in general. Set ρ = −1. Suppose there are two buyers and two items. Both buyers have the same preference for each item and the same budgets; i.e. a 11 = a 12 = a 21 = a 22 = 1 2 , and e 1 = e 2 = 1. Initially, at time t = 0, suppose that b (0) 4 . So this simple example shows that in this setting, the spending will not converge to the market equilibrium; rather, it will cycle among 2 states.
Instead, we observe that in the substitutes domain, excluding Cobb-Douglas utilities, this rule is the mirror descent updating rule using the KL divergence for the following optimization problem.
We exclude Cobb-Douglas utilities, because as ρ i → 0 the corresponding term in Φ tends to ∞. When restricted to linear utilities, i.e. ρ i = 1 for all i, this is simply Shmyrev's convex program [44] for these markets.
In the complementary domain, the mirror descent updating rule for this function is:
Accordingly, we adopt this as the generalization of Proportional Response to the complementary domain. This rule can be easily implemented in the distributed environment of Fisher markets. In each round, each buyer only needs the prices computed in the previous round to compute its update. Thus, to implement the update rule, it suffices to have the sellers broadcast their prices by the end of each round.
Interestingly, this update rule is also the best response action to the current prices for each buyer. We note that this rule can be viewed as a tatonnement update if we define
However, this is not the same rule as was used for the tatonnement analyzed in recent works regarding Fisher markets [11, 16] .
For linear utilities, update rule (2) was analyzed in [2] . For the substitutes domain excluding linear utilities, a faster linear rate of convergence was shown in [50] , but not based on considering the above optimization problem. To obtain a linear rate of convergence for an analysis based on optimizing Φ via a mirror descent with a KL Divergence, we introduce the notion of strong Bregman convexity. We also coin the term Bregman convexity for an analogous notion introduced in [2] ).
If the direction of the inequalities and the signs on the d h (x, y) terms are reversed, the function is said to be Bregman concave (or strongly Bregman concave respectively). (rint(C) denotes the relative interior of C.)
Consider the update rule:
An analogous Theorem for L-Bregman convex functions was given in [2] :
, and x T is the point reached after T applications of the mirror descent update rule (4) . Then,
We show that in the CES substitutes domain, excluding linear utilities, Φ is a strongly Bregman convex function w.r.t. the KL-divergence on spending, thereby providing an alternative derivation of Zhang's result. In addition, in the CES complements domain, excluding Leontief utilities, Φ is a strongly Bregman concave function w.r.t. the KL divergence on spending, which yields a proof of linear convergence in this domain. These analyses are readily modified to give a 1/T rate of convergence if we include respectively the linear and Leontief utilities. These results are made precise in the following theorem. • If all buyers have substitutes CES utilities, then
• Suppose that in addition no buyer has a linear utility. Let σ = min i {1 − ρ i }. Then, 
• Suppose that in addition no buyer has a Leontief utility. Let σ = min i
The first two results are shown in Corollaries 6.4, 6.5, respectively, and the remaining results can be found in the full version of the paper. We also note that as shown in Lemma 13 in [2] , if b i j = e i /m for all i and j, then KL(b * ||b) ≤ log mn, which provides a possibly more intuitive version of the above bounds. Theorem 3.3 does not cover buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities, because, as already noted, the terms in Φ for such buyers are equal to ∞. Note that these buyers always wish to allocate their spending in fixed proportions regardless of the prices. Thus, arguably, it would be natural for these buyers to always have the equilibrium spending. But even if this were not true initially, after one update this property would hold, and remain true henceforth. Thus the presence of these buyers would seem to have little effect on the convergence. Indeed, the above bounds hold with KL(b * i ||b 0 i ) replaced by KL(b * i ||b 1 i ) and T replaced by T − 1 on the RHS. But to obtain bounds in terms of KL(b * i ||b 0 i ) appears to require substantially more effort; this analysis is given in the full paper. The rates of convergence are similar to those given in Theorem 3.3.
Damped Proportional Response
But what if we want to allow a mix of substitutes and complementary utilities? The difficulty we face is that the objective function Φ is no longer either convex or concave. Rather, if we fix the spending of the buyers with complementary utilities, the resulting restricted Φ is convex, while if we fix the spending of the buyers with substitutes utilities, the resulting restricted Φ is concave. As it happens, the equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of the function Φ. Also, a suitable dynamic will converge to this saddle point. To show this, we introduce a saddle-point convergence analysis. To this end, we define the following notion.
, if it satisfies the following constraints.
(1) For fixed y, f (·, y) is a convex function;
(2) For fixed x, f (x, ·) is a concave function;
The saddle point is the "optimal" point of the convex-concave function, which is the minimum point in the x-direction and the maximum point in the y-direction, defined formally as follows. Now consider the following update rule:
We can then show an O (1/T ) empirical rate of convergence, as stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4 . Suppose that f is (L X , L Y )-convex-concave, and there exists a saddle point (x * , y * ). In addition, suppose that (x, y) are updated according to (6) . Then:
Note that the second part of the theorem follows immediately from the first part because f (·, y * ) is a convex function and f (x * , ·) is a concave function.
Consequently, we obtain an empirical O (1/T ) rate of convergence for the following Damped Proportional Response update.
We say it is damped because the update rule uses the geometric mean of the current value and the standard Proportional Response update.
A natural question is whether a linear convergence rate is possible if the linear and Leontief utilities are excluded. The answer is yes, and to obtain this we need a stronger condition on the convex-concave objective function, as given in the following definition. As before, the above results exclude Cobb-Douglas utilities.
Arguably, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utilities should always have the equilibrium spending, or failing that, should immediately update to this spending. But for mathematical consistency, we suppose they are performing the same type of damped update as the other buyers. In this case, our previous potential function can't be used when we include Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We now need to include a term in the potential function for each buyer with a Cobb-Douglas utility as their spending keeps changing.
We will need the following notation. Let b >0 , b =0 , and b <0 denote the spending of those buyers with ρ i > 0, ρ i = 0, and ρ i < 0, respectively. Accordingly, we will write
The resulting function is still convex in b >0 and concave in b <0 . The construction is given in the full paper. We note that the update rule for the buyers with ρ i = 0 is given by:
Theorem 3.6. Suppose buyers repeatedly update their spending using the Damped Proportional Response rule (7) . Then
and the potential function Φ converges to the market equilibrium as follows:
ii. If in addition no buyer has a linear or Leontief utility,
Weaker bounds are shown in Corollaries 8.2 and 8.3, respectively. The complete proof is given in the full paper. 
RELATED WORK
The concept of a market equilibrium was first proposed by Walras [48] along with a description of the tatonnement process. Since then, studies of market equilibria and tatonnement have received much attention in economics, operations research, and most recently in computer science. A fairly recent account of the classic perspective in economics is given in [34] .
Computer scientists, beginning with the work by Deng et al. [19] , showed that computing equilibria was a hard problem in general; see also [18, 41] . This led to much work on polynomial time algorithms for restricted classes of markets, e.g. [13, 20, 21, 25] .
The Eisenberg-Gale program for the case of linear utilities was formulated in [24] and then generalized to homothetic functions in [23] ; further generalizations were given in [28] . The maxima of these convex programs correspond to the equilibria of the corresponding markets. In particular, when buyer or agent utilities are homothetic, the optimum of the Eisenberg-Gale program corresponds to the optimum Nash Social Welfare; interestingly, this optimum also appears to provide good outcomes when apportioning indivisible goods [4, 5] . Recently, Cole et al. [15] identified another variant of the Eisenberg-Gale program that captured the best currently-known polynomial-time approximate solution for the indivisible setting.
The analysis most similar to ours is the one in [2] which considers convex functions that obey a constraint which we name L-Bregman convexity w.r.t. a Bregman divergence (see Definition 1). Our work generalizes this notion substantially.
The earliest analyses of tatonnement showed convergence in exchange economies with gross substitutes utilities, first for continuous updating [1] and then for discrete updates [45] , but it was shown to diverge in general [43] . Recent works have analyzed its convergence properties in specific markets, primarily Fisher markets [11, 12, 16] . Cheung et al. [11] showed that tatonnement is equivalent to coordinate descent on a convex function for several classes of Fisher markets, and consequently that a suitable tatonnement converges toward the market equilibrium in two classes of markets: complementary-CES Fisher markets and Leontief Fisher markets.
Other dynamics have been considered. In particular, Dvijotham et al. [22] study sellers best responding in a setting in which they form beliefs about other sellers' strategies. They obtain linear convergence in Fisher markets where buyers have weak gross substitutes utilities. In the context of network flow control, Low and Lapsley [32] adopted an optimization approach to derive a dynamic protocol where both prices (of links) and flow demands of agents are updated, and showed that the protocol converges to a social-welfare maximizing state. The update rules (2), (3) look quite similar to a game-learning dynamic called log-linear learning [3, 33] (by suitably viewing spendings as probability densities), but due to different contexts (games vs. markets), the actual behaviors and the analyses have significant qualitative differences.
Convex-concave saddle-point problems can be reduced to non-smooth convex minimization problems, for which algorithms yielding O (1/ √ T ) convergence rate exist. Its wide applications (e.g., to two-person zero-sum game equilibrium) have motivated exploration of properties of the underlying function which support faster converging algorithms [36] [37] [38] [39] 42] . In this paper, we present a new property and a simple algorithm which yields an O (1/T ) empirical convergence rate. In our opinion, its analysis is quite simple, which may well open the door to further exploration. Indeed, we have taken such a step by presenting a variant of our new property for which the same algorithm yields a linear point-wise convergence rate. 
LINEAR CONVERGENCE WITH STRONG BREGMAN CONVEXITY
Our proof will use the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.1.
[6] If x + is the optimal point for the optimization problem:
where C is a compact convex set, then, for any x ∈ C, d (x, y) .
, and x t and x t +1 are the points reached after t and t + 1 applications of the mirror descent update rule (4). Then
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 5.1 with y = x t , x + = x t +1 , and x = x * ,
By strong Bregman-convexity, with y = x t , and x = x t +1 ,
and with y = x t and x = x * ,
Combining (9), (10), and (11), gives, for t ≥ 0,
On multiplying both sides of the above inequality by L L−σ t , and then summing over 0 ≤ t < T , the RHS becomes a telescoping sum, and hence
and the result follows. □
CONVERGENCE OF PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE
We consider the following potential function:
. For those i for which ρ i −∞,
; and for those i for which
We deduce:
Proof.
.
The Substitutes Domain. The following lemma states the equivalence between mirror descent and proportional response in the substitutes domain; it follow readily from the definition of b t +1 for Proportional Response (given by (2)). Lemma 6.2. For buyers with CES substitutes utilities, the Proportional Response update is the same as the mirror descent update, given by:
The next lemma states several properties of the potential function in the substitutes domain.
is the spending at the market equilibrium if and only if b is the minimum point of Φ.
Proof. The first two claims follow from Lemma 6.1 with a little calculation. We show the third claim for CES utilities, leaving the cases of linear utilities to the full paper.
First, we note that the update rule will leave b unchanged exactly if b = b * . This implies that for every i, the values a i j (b i j ) ρ i −1 /p ρ i j are the same at a minimum of Φ, for if b t is optimal then b t +1 = b t , and so for all j the multipliers on b t i j are the same, and these multipliers are a i j (b i j ) ρ i −1 /p ρ i j . But this is exactly the condition that holds when buyer i is maximizing her utility at prices p: a i j (x i j ) ρ i −1 /p j are the same for all j, and since x i j = b i j /p j , this means a i j (b i j ) ρ i −1 /p ρ i j are the same for all j. □ Let b * be the spending at some market equilibrium. Applying Theorem 3.2 yields:
Furthermore, if there is no buyer with a linear utility function, then, applying Theorem 3.1 yields:
We now explain how to recover Zhang's bound [50] . From (12),
In [50] , ϕ (t ) is used to denote i
. We have obtained the exact same bound on [50] , and thus can deduce the identical convergence rate.
The Complementary Domain. The analysis here is similar to that for the substitutes domain and is given in the full version of the paper.
SADDLE POINT ANALYSIS
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Recall that
This is equivalent to
Since f is (L X , L y )-convex-concave, the third property -see (5) -gives:
where (1) is deduced from (b) in Definition 2 with (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x t , y t ) and (2) is deduced from (a) in Definition 2 with (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x t , y t ) and (x, y) = (x * , y t +1 ). 
Adding these two inequalities gives:
Summing over t yields:
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Using (8) instead of (5), we deduce the following from (13) instead of (14):
Summing up these two inequalities gives:
Note that f (x t , y * ) − f (x * , y t ) is positive for each t, so the result follows. □
ANALYSIS OF DAMPED PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE
Excluding Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions. First, we consider a simplified situation where there is no buyer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. We want to use the technique developed in the saddle point analysis to obtain a convergence result. The potential function is the same as before.
We make the following observations. Lemma 8.1. If ρ i > 0 for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7) ) is equivalent to mirror descent with a halved step size, defined as follows:
if −∞ < ρ i < 0 for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) is equivalent to mirror descent (really ascent as this is a concave function) with a halved step size defined as follows: and if ρ i = −∞ for buyer i, then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) is equivalent to mirror descent (really ascent as this is a concave function) with a halved step sizem defined as follows:
Proof. By calculation. □ By Lemma 6.1 and with a simple calculation one can show that, in Definition 2, if we set
Furthermore, let b * >0 and b * <0 be the market equilibrium of the Fisher market.
is a saddle point of the potential function Φ. Theorem 3.4 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 8.2. The Damped Proportional Response (given by (7)) converges to the equilibrium with a convergence rate of:
Moreover, if we assume there is no buyer with either a linear utility of a Leontief utility function, then, by Lemma 6.1, Ψ(·, ·) is a (min i: 
Then the Damped Proportional Response (given by (7) ) converges to the equilibrium with a convergence rate of
The Entire CES Range Now we consider the Damped Proportional Response with a damping factor of 2 over the entire CES range, i.e. including Cobb-Douglas utilities. Recall that we modify our potential function to include terms for the buyers with ρ i = 0. However, for this new modified function, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions don't actually perform mirror descent. Fortunately, we can make two observations. First, the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions converge quickly to the equilibrium independently of everyone else's spending. Second, the buyers whose utility functions are not Cobb-Douglas will still perform the mirror descent (ascent) procedure. So, intuitively, in our analysis, we regard the spending of the buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions as a parameter, θ , of f θ (x, y), where x represents the spending of the strictly substitutes buyers and y represents the spending of the strictly complementary buyers. Remember, in the case with no Cobb-Douglas utilities, the market equilibrium corresponded to a saddle point. Here, similarly, a market equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point of f θ * (·, ·), where θ * is the spending at the market equilibrium of those buyers with Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We prove the following two claims.
(1) θ converges to θ * quickly;
(2) when θ tends to θ * , though x and y perform the mirror descent based on the gradient of f θ (x, y) and not of f θ * (x, y), (x, y) will still converge quickly to (x * , y * ), the saddle point of f θ * (·, ·).
We thereby show that Damped Proportional Response converges to the market equilibrium even when faced with the entire range of CES utilities.
OTHER MEASURES OF CONVERGENCE
The potential function ϕ appears to be closely related to the Eisenberg-Gale program. In particular, we can show that in the substitutes domain, when applying update rule (2), the Proportional Response update, the objective function Ψ for the Eisenberg-Gale program converges at least as fast as Φ, i.e. that Ψ(
, and that in the complementary domain, when applying update rule (3), the objective function for the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale program converges at least as fast as Φ. These claims are shown in the full paper. . As the equilibrium need not be unique in terms of spending for either linear or Leontief utilities, this lemma is not going to yield a bound on the convergence rate of the spending in these cases, as it can be applied to any equilibrium. Similarly in the combined domain, still excluding linear and Leontief utilities, we can observe that
In addition, since KL(p||p * ) ≤ KL(b||b * ) we can immediately obtain analogous bounds on the KL divergence of the prices. Furthermore, for the substitutes domain, including linear utilities, Lemma 6.1 also implies that KL(p||p * )
